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 During Augustine’s life, government authorities in Africa were generally friendly to the 
Christianity he came to adopt and defend.  His correspondence mentions one imperial magistrate 
in Africa, Virius Nicomachus Flavianus, a pagan vicar of Africa who seemed partial to Donatist 
Christians whom Augustine considered secessionists. Otherwise, from the 390s to 430, assorted 
proconsuls, vicars, and tribunes sent from the imperial chancery and asked to maintain order in 
North Africa were willing to enforce government edicts against Donatists and pagans.1 And, to 
an extent, Augustine endorsed enforcement.  He was troubled by punitive measures that looked 
excessive to him, yet scholars generally agree with Peter Burnell that Augustine unambiguously 
approved punitive judgments as an “unavoidable” necessity. But Burnell and others seem to 
make too much of it: Augustine’s position on punishment supposedly indicates that he posited 
“an essential continuity” (rather than emphasized the contrast) between “any given state” and the 
celestial or “eschatological” city of God.2 
 What follows will review some of Augustine’s most often cited remarks on punishment 
and a number that are less well known.3 We shall find that his approval was not only grudgingly 
given and guarded at times but relatively restrictive and occasionally accompanied by doubts 
about the effectiveness of punishment in terrestrial cities.  And, even when he acknowledged 
severe measures usefully preserved terrestrial peace, he underscored distinctions between that 
peace and the peace of the celestial city. Augustine depicted fear and force in this world in ways 
that ought to give pause to historians prepared to emphasize “essential continuit[ies]” between a 
punishing government and a Christianity ready to propose “complementary roles” for each. And 
this assessment of Augustine’s punishments ought to give pause to political theorists ever ready, 
it seems, to reconstruct his “morally robust civic liberalism.”4  
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     *                 *                  * 
 God punished. Israel was sent into exile for infidelity. The wreckage left in the wake of 
the Vandal invasion of Africa could be construed as punishment for Christians’ attachments to 
worldly possessions, much as Rome’s fate was years before, specifically, the city’s humiliation 
in 410. At that time Augustine proposed that the Romans received the thumping they deserved 
for having interpreted material successes as signs of divine favor and having put their faith in 
what was “unstable and perishable.”5 The threat of eternal torment loomed over the exceptionally 
greedy.  To those who doubted God could set an inextinguishable fire for sinners, fire that would 
perpetually scald without consuming them, Augustine catalogued marvels in nature confounding  
expectations. If limestone’s reactions to the elements, notably fire and water, seemed unnatural, 
why should one presume God’s punishments conformed to common sense?6 
 That answer--that the supernatural will naturally seem strange--of course, begs the 
question of cruelty. From Augustine’s protests against “softening” the interminably painful 
punishments that awaited the damned, we might infer that some Christian interpreters were 
uncomfortable with the nature and duration of divine punitive practice. Augustine, on that issue, 
lamented that tender hearts were parts of Christians’ constitutions.7  The tender-hearted, after all, 
could be much more susceptible to Donatist Christians who complained, during the late fourth 
and early fifth centuries, when rival Christian bishops--Augustine among them, after 406--urged 
authorities to intimidate and punish them. Donatists referred to Jesus’s instructions to the apostle 
Peter to sheath his sword rather than to punish would-be persecutors.8 
 Augustine could be forgiving. He poured praise on a Donatist bishop who surrendered his 
see, ostensibly for the sake of the peace and unity of the African church.9  For years, trusting that 
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instruction and kind words could draw Donatist secessionists back into the church, he was 
prepared to let their previous indiscretion go unpunished. He doubted the appropriateness of 
formulating new--and enforcing old--punitive measures advocated by his colleagues. But, as his 
invitations to reconciliation were refused, he defended the use of intimidation and coercion, and 
he referred to New Testament passages that seemed to sanction bruising behavior. He deployed 
the parable in which Jesus ordered that “guests” be compelled to attend a wedding banquet. He 
remembered that the apostle Paul announced he was ready to punish disobedience and that Paul 
himself had been “brought to the gospel” by some rough handling.10 
 To Augustine, the secessionists’ sense of superiority--which, in their judgment, was 
legitimate and which licensed them to confiscate the churches from which they seceded--was 
conspicuously contrary to the humility prescribed by their  sacred texts. Donatists argued that 
baptisms in their rivals’ churches were invalid because bishops presiding over that sacrament 
declined to countenance the century-old coup against colleagues who allegedly collaborated with 
pagan persecutors of the church.  Baptisms in the early fifth century, in other words, were bogus 
as long as presiding bishops would not repudiate predecessors in the early fourth century whom 
the first Donatists accused of having caved under government pressure. Augustine denied that a 
bishop’s allegiance to long-gone partisans or his character affected sacraments he administered. 
(Indeed, the secessionists ought to recall, Augustine said, that Jesus had accepted baptism from 
someone inferior to himself.11) In Augustine’s judgment, the Donatists’ arrogance ensured that 
they would be subjected to those dreadful, eternal punishments that were reserved for those who 
misplaced their faith in what was “perishable,” in specious virtues as well as possessions. Hence, 
when he eventually accepted that it was advantageous (non inutile) to ask the government to 
assist the church in disciplining, intimidating, correcting, and coercing secessionists, Augustine 
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explained that punitive measures were in the Donatists’ interest. They were “paternal” (paterna 
flagella), sparing secessionists eternal torment in the hereafter as well as stopping them from 
sowing discord in the here and now.12 
 Ivonne Tholen notes that Augustine rarely introduced the devil into his anti-Donatist 
polemic.13  Nonetheless, the Donatists’ libels against the Christianity that he and his closest 
colleagues defended tempted Augustine to brand his rivals as diabolical. He was ready to bury 
the past (pro me sunt gesta omnia), he insisted, but a demon “implanted” in the Donatists’ souls 
kept them dredging up and disseminating their ascertainably inaccurate account of the origins of 
the schism. The secessionists’ persistence attested a satanic presence and turned their schism into 
sin and heresy. In effect, they forfeited their Christianity, and the devil’s counsels kept Donatist 
clergy and laity beyond non-coercive recall.14 
 They were a sect, and, Augustine repeatedly pointed out, the sectarians were uncharitable 
toward each other--spawning sub-sects--as well as uncharitable toward Christians who believed 
the secession of their forebears and the enduring disunity unwarranted. And, to Augustine, their 
fissiparous character exhibited in the intense rivalry among Donatists made their claim to be the 
authentic Christian church ludicrous.  Besides, all Donatists sects had severed their connections 
not only with many North African churches but also with all, save a very few, Christians across 
the Mediterranean, as if to say that “Christ only bought Africa”--and a portion of Africa, at that--
with his atonement for the sins of all the faithful. Did Jesus die to redeem a region or to save the 
secessionist squadrons therein, which--unforgiving--vilified the faithful who lived among them 
and preferred to remain in communion with churches in Rome or Arles, that is, with a universal 
or catholic church? Noli quiescere; one must not let such absurdity pass undisputed, Augustine 
said, stipulating that reprimands be accompanied by blows (verberibus).15 
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 He acknowledged that the fairness of battering the sectarians might not have been 
immediately obvious, but he asserted that God had placed secular powers in sympathy with the 
church for good reason, knowing his faithful would eventually be in danger of being overtaken 
by rivals. So it was fitting--and not unfair--for the faithful to urge the government to use punitive 
measures. Indeed, there could be no unfairness (iniquitas) in God; punishments and the suffering 
they occasioned were “remedial” as well as “paternal.” Augustine and his colleagues were not 
seeking vengeance. They were looking for--and they found, he said--the gratitude of those 
Donatist rivals who, moved by fear and force, saw the error of their ways and rejoined the 
catholic church.16 
 Executions precluded reconciliation, so Augustine opposed them. Besides, capital 
punishment, he claimed, even if warranted by the crimes of murderous thugs who attached 
themselves to secessionist sects, soiled the memory of their martyred victims.17 Furthermore, 
executing offenders put their accusers in danger of retaliation, and the death penalty would keep 
the wronged-yet-not-vindictive among the victims’ families from coming forward to report what 
would lead to another’s death. Augustine’s principal objective was religious reintegration, which, 
pro tempore, required deterrence. He expected reconciliation to follow, reconciliation that would 
end a century’s cycle of violence and, ideally--and orderly--restore the African church’s peace. 
As Júlio César Magalhães de Oliveira proposes, in another context, Augustine was “a man of 
order.”18 
 Still, his sense of order did not incline him to proclaim his support for the government’s 
efforts to punish the Manichees, perhaps because, in his youth and for nearly ten years, he  had 
been fascinated by their ideas. He grew disenchanted only after he encountered Faustus, one of 
the cult’s impresarios, who, if we may trust the account in Augustine’s Confessions, failed to live 
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up to his reputation for eloquence and intelligence. He seemed incompetent, and Augustine let on 
later that he was suffering from buyer’s remorse immediately after their first conversations. From 
the time he committed to Christianity, he also understood that the expectations Faustus and other 
Manichaean specialists encouraged--expectations that they knew and would reveal secrets in the 
faith’s sacred texts as well as in nature--encroached on the church’s prerogatives.19 Even before 
it tolerated Christianity, the government, for its part, considered the cult subversive. Late in the 
third century, laws were passed against Manichaeism, and its persistence prompted subsequent 
edicts. Provincial officials were told in 407, while Augustine was formulating justifications for 
the punishment of Donatists, that they would be punished if they did not enforce existing laws 
and punish the Manichees.20 No doubt, he was satisfied--by then he thought Manichaeism put 
souls’ salvation in jeopardy--but he was relatively indifferent to proliferating punishments.21 
 Generally, he believed punishment deterred, disciplined, and suppressed--but it did not 
contribute to the establishment of genuine justice (vera justitia), which was unattainable in this 
wicked world.22 He may have suspected as much by the late 390s, when he confided what had 
become of his political ambitions ten years before.23 Robert Dodaro, however, could be correct: 
Augustine’s spiraling despair of ever achieving genuine justice with retributive, restorative, 
punitive measures may be related to his increasing concern to counter Pelagians’ optimism. 
Nonetheless, his comments on magistrates’ inability to do more than damage control, which 
were composed as he became acquainted with Pelagianism, look to have been based on his 
previously expressed pessimism.24 
 His most explicit reference to damage control surfaces in a letter to Macedonius, the 
Vicar of Africa in 413 and 414.  There, Augustine wrote about the parts punishment played in 
keeping wickedness in check (coercentur mali) and in restraining the impudence of persons who, 
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without the likelihood that they would pay for their outrages, would take every chance to prey on 
their virtuous and peacable neighbors (coercetur audacia). Augustine was trying to convince 
Macedonius that bishops, who petitioned authorities to spare those offenders who looked to be 
promising candidates for rehabilitation, were not opposed to punitive policies.  All agreed that 
punishments inspired fear among the wicked, which enabled good citizens to live without fear. 
Good citizens were beneficiaries of the damage control that was necessary in a world where so 
many of Adam’s offspring behaved criminally; the church and its faithful were beneficiaries.25 
Bishops would have been ill-advised unequivocally to oppose punishments, but a prelate’s job 
was to spot opportunities to redeem miscreants, to preach repentance, and to work for personal 
rehabilitations. Augustine suggested to Macedonius that the church and civil magistrates could 
cooperate to realize what we might term “relative justice,” a return of stolen property, assuring 
the vicar that prelates were his allies on the issue of restitution.  But that assurance was not the 
first step toward collaborations that might lead to a rehabilitation or evangelization of society.26 
Cruelty and villainy were too pervasive. For Augustine, the point of punishment was to bridle 
corrupt desire. Punitive measures could never obliterate it; Augustine’s letter to Macedonius 
implies that corruption was current in the courts. Litigants bought special consideration. The 
court clerks received tips, which resembled bribes and which could be justified, Augustine 
allowed, if proceeds were shared with the poor. But money paid to judges, before or after 
verdicts were formulated, and to witnesses was unconscionable.27 
 Why not leave punishment to God who was above bribery? Although God may have 
seemed asleep to onlookers who saw that, in time, the unrighteous and shameless often went 
unpunished, the faithful believed that, in God’s time, the inordinately acquisitive and arrogant 
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would be punished everlastingly.  In the interim, all citizens must learn to live with the secular 
courts’ imperfections.28 
 Augustine did have a court of his own. Constantine decreed that bishops preside as 
judges in assemblies or “audiences” to resolve disputes and, in effect, to punish losers whose 
cases were unconvincing. But Augustine groused that parishioners’ complaints (or “causes”) 
were frequently unrelated to their faith and concerned secular business.29 True, the apostle Paul 
directed the faithful in Corinth not to take their squabbles to secular magistrates, yet the itinerant 
apostle never stayed in one place long enough to cope with the consequences.  Augustine made a 
point of putting Paul above the fray, never having to umpire or resolve disputes among querulous 
Christians. Centuries later, Christianity’s bishops not as lucky. They were uncomfortably aware 
of what followed from Paul’s prohibition--vexatious litigation.30 
 Arguably, the most serious problem facing bishops presiding in their “audiences” was 
that their work as pastors was compromised by their work as magistrates, by punitive verdicts 
they delivered. For when two parties clashed in court, each supposing that justice resided on its 
side, at least one would leave aggrieved and with a grudge against the judge. He was corrupt or, 
at best, imperceptive, litigious losers would say, impairing his ability to console and counsel.31  
Within courts, the faithful whined, ranted, and raged, even when they were attempting to right 
palpable wrongs and punish wrongdoers.32 
 Determining disciplinary measures was a delicate matter when bishops were caught 
misbehaving. After pronouncing judgment on Antoninus, whom he had appointed bishop of 
Fussala, a diocese he carved from his own, Augustine was likely relieved to hear that he had 
been scratched from the list of judges hearing his nominee’s appeals. Augustine presumed that, 
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“until the end of time,” churches would be led by officials seeking promotion for personal gain, 
yet he thought that Antoninus was cut from different cloth.  He was wrong. Antoninus extorted 
funds and feathered his nest with what belonged to parishioners. Augustine found no compelling 
evidence of sexual misconduct, of which the thieving bishop of Fussala had been accused, so he 
dismissed those charges, yet he ordered Antoninus to give back property he had commandeered 
to build his new home. In effect, Augustine also deposed his appointee, instructing the residents 
to select a new bishop. But Antoninus was permitted to retain quasi-episcopal jurisdiction over 
several estates, and that seemed to satisfy him until the consecration of his successor at Fussala 
was scheduled. Then, he appealed.33 
 Augustine was angry; Antoninus, he said, shamelessly packed his account of the episode 
that accompanied his appeal with lies.34  Yet they prompted two successive bishops of Rome to 
order reviews of the original accusations and deliberations--reviews from which, as we learned, 
Augustine was excluded. We know nothing about the outcome. And we cannot tell what led to 
Antoninus’s appointment and why Augustine let him salvage some authority. Possibly he was 
popular among his (and Augustine’s) clerical colleagues. We can only infer from the tone and 
substance of Augustine’s extended review of the affair that he regretted his appointment and 
especially his appointee’s expropriations and antics. As for the relatively light punishment he 
initially imposed, Augustine appears to have feared that resorting to something more severe at 
the onset would have resulted in a round of recriminations, embarrassed the church, and given 
pagans and Donatists a scandal to spin to the disadvantage of catholic Christianity.35 
       *     *    * 
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 Augustine generally did not hesitate to confirm the need to punish those pagans and 
Donatists when they became a threat to the social order in Africa. Historian Jill Harries contrasts 
Augustine with those Christians whose “principles were incompatible with . . . the secular usages 
of Rome”--with idealists who were unprepared “to cop[e] with the harsh realities of competitive 
church politics.” For Harries, Augustine demonstrated “a measure of social acceptance” for the 
cruelty needed to rule, while applying “unrelenting pressure” to temper justice with mercy--and 
keeping magistrates “under constant scrutiny.”  “At no period in their history,” Harries adds, did 
the Romans favor clemency for the condemned and spare the accused (and witnesses) torture, so 
she gives Augustine along with late antiquity’s other Christian “realists” credit for having coped 
with the “harsh realities” of crime and punishment and for the little moderation she perceives.36 
But Christianity’s civilizing influence, had it been widespread and conspicuous, would attract 
swarms of historians, one would imagine, and it has not. Still, there is no denying that Augustine 
had a few magistrates rethinking the severity of their sentences.  He intervened to save Christian 
rioters at Calama, thirty miles from Hippo, but in another’s diocese, from corporal punishment.37 
That said, however, as we have discovered, scholars who insist he posited a “complementarity” 
or an “essential continuity” between the secular and the celestial often  emphasize a punishing 
rather than a pardoning Augustine, an Augustine whose City of God specifies that magistrates, 
who lawfully sentence criminals to death, were not only the law’s and state’s instruments but 
God’s as well.  And, although he did not make a habit of explicitly transforming government 
magistrates into church ministers and God’s executors, he sanctioned magistrates’ use of the 
sword (exserere gladium) “to preserve public discipline.”38 
 Some collateral effects were equally, if not more, desirable. Blows deterred, but they also 
instructed and corrected offenders.39 The latter two purposes could be termed therapeutic and, as 
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John von Heyking says, “educative.” Von Heyking cites the coercion used to counter “the force 
of [bad] habit[s]” and suspects Augustine appreciated that the “evasive rhetoric of rehabilitation” 
often concealed “a lust to punish,” which was related to the lust to dominate that afflicted all in 
power. The implication is that Augustine realized both the need to set limits to coercion as well 
as the need for therapy in this unruly, wicked world, conceding, as Charles Mathewes explains, 
that “no realistic political psychology can do without” the fear that the threat and the force of 
punitive measures prompted in would-be offenders.40 
 The impression that Augustine was fully engaged in magistrates’ efforts to control and 
punish crime and in religious initiatives to temper punitive measures to ensure select criminals’ 
rehabilitation appears to reinforce contemporary historical theologians’ and ethicists’ efforts to 
claim him as a social reformer. He looks to them to have been comprehensively interested in 
personal and social reconstruction--and in penology’s place in such challenges.  Eric Gregory 
writes about Augustine’s admirable, “civic liberalism.” Claude Lepelley, acknowledging that 
Augustine would have preferred to preach away bad habits, features the prelate’s anxious yet 
artful participation in discussions intended to establish tenants’ rights without significantly 
eroding landlords’ privileges.41 Christoph Horn’s Augustine is neither a political cynic nor a 
“holier-than-thou” (heilsegoistischen) escapist; to Horn, he was an activist struggling to cope 
with an ambiguous, if not impossible, task.  Augustine, that is, believed that the world was as 
God wanted it--but also believed that prelates should labor to change it. Slavery, for example, 
was fallout from multiple wars of conquest but was God’s punishment as well; donec transeat 
iniquitas, until social inequalities were obsolete, the iniquitous domination of one human over 
another would continue, yet Augustine was resolved to present bondage as a calamity and an 
injustice that licensed neither masters’ nor slavers’ inhumanity.42  Punishments, he said, were 
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pervasive; “all life is punishment.”43 But what troubled him was that the course for secular or 
ecclesial judges, who allocated special sentences and torments in return for offenses and who, 
therefore, added to this life’s “punishment” was never clear. At the end of the first decade of the 
fifth century, writing to friends, Augustine asked whether magistrates were simply making earth 
a more or less tolerable penal colony. Did it make sense to punish? Passages from sacred texts 
were not clear or consistent on the issue. To toss aside biblical directives to judge, rebuke, and 
punish seemed unconscionable, yet what was one to do with warnings in Mathew’s gospel that 
we not judge (Matthew 7:1)?  And, Augustine continued, as if he regretted remarks making him 
seem to some eagerly engaged in civic life and penal reform, one could never tell if punishment 
would help offenders or sinners make progress. Official retribution might just as well fuel their 
anger and increase their offenses.44 
 Given the uncertainty, one understands why there is not enough in his correspondence or 
sermons--and certainly not in his City of God--to establish his consistent stake in penology or in 
law enforcement. And his doubts about punitive policy seem to undermine attempts to represent 
him as an “accommodationist,” to borrow a term from James Smith, who also questions the 
term’s application; Smith suggests--correctly, I think--that Augustine was ever mindful of the 
“mutually exclusive teloi of practices” that gave civic virtues and faith’s demands “their identity-
forming capacities.”  He knew he could not live by his ideals in the fourth and fifth centuries--as 
if the kingdom of God had come.  He was not what Smith calls “antithetical,” which is to say he 
was disinclined to condemn civic virtues. He lived strategically, acknowledging the divergence 
in the interests of the church and the government and allowing that the latter’s imperfections 
were reflected in its punishments as well as in what was punished.45 
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 Philosopher Rae Langton uses the distinction between living strategically and living by 
one’s ideals to illustrate the predicament faced by Kantians.  They may strive toward the ideals 
associated with the categorical imperative against lying, say, yet, with predators at the door and 
prey to protect, they are loath to live by those ideals. Doing so, they would become instruments 
of evil. Langton makes no mention of Augustine, but her brief for living strategically in worry-
infested waters (and for deception) applies to his consideration of punitive measures; Augustine, 
we might say, strategically participated in initiatives twenty-first-century readers would identify 
with social reconstruction, yet, as historian Miles Hollingsworth correctly infers, “advances that 
we associate with progress and development are resigned, by [Augustine], to the realm of the 
conventional rather than [that of] the foundational.”46 
 To expect something more--to forge “essential continuities” and cobble together 
“complementary roles” connecting coercive civic authorities with the religious virtues that 
Augustine articulated--one would have to posit his intensive investment in the fate of “the 
conventional.”  In so much of what he preached and wrote, however, he explicitly denied that 
success at social reconstruction pleased God.47 He accused Donatists of failing to observe the 
distinction between what mere creatures could do to mediate between God and humanity and 
what would-be infallible moral arbiters do to construct their societies of saints.48 The African 
secessionists, much as pagan moralists, simply denied the persistence of sin. Sins steal upon us 
(subrepunt), Augustine insisted, during the normal course of life. Conventions or customs were 
riddled with them.  No comprehensive social reconstruction, to which a sound penology would 
presumably have contributed, could have aligned the terrestrial cities with the celestial. Neither 
Donatists nor pagans had devised (or could devise) sufficient disciplinary measures to purge the 
sins that “never cease seeping into this world through our infirmities, as relentlessly as the waves 
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of the sea.”  The strategy was to keep the ship afloat--bonis operibus sentinate, to order all hands 
to pump out the bilges with their good works, but not to steer the ship of state, buffeted by rough 
seas to some secure harbor, well away from the waves of humanity’s infirmities; no safe harbor 
in this wicked world existed.49 
 Agreeing with two correspondents at the end of the fifth century’s first decade, Augustine 
conceded that “pumping out the bilges”--living strategically--required close association with and 
not a militant distrust of--the world and the worldly who prescribe and enforce its punishments. 
The faithful must work with and among magistrates, he advised, because “unless one conforms 
somewhat” (aliquantulum congruamus) and participates in activities from which the Christians 
would draw their neighbors away, they can do nothing to help them.  For Augustine, however, 
Christians’ conscience prohibited them from being drawn too close, from making prosperity or 
social progress their principal aims.50 The church and the faith’s sacred literature, especially the 
psalms, Augustine believed, summoned Christians from short-lived satisfactions, teaching them 
what they ought to desire.51 The danger was that adversity, prosperity, and political responsibility 
weighed Christians down (praegravata).  They forgot that life was perpetual perishing and 
feared the “perishing” that punishment prompted--confiscation of their properties, forfeiture of 
their freedom, and occasionally loss of their lives.52  Augustine reminded them that “love casts 
out fear,” specifically, the fear of government punishments. Good behavior that derived from 
fear was, he continued, far inferior to the good motivated by the faithful’s love of 
righteousness.53 
 Yet, as noted, Augustine considered fear and force useful. Prelates and ordinary people 
who were attracted to his “brand” of Christianity in Africa had to be protected from Donatists’ 
alleged thuggish accomplices, the circumcellions. Pagan idolaters in Utica, Sufes, and Calama 
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were known to have assaulted Christians of all stripes. In Sufes, dozens of Christians had been 
massacred in 399, after a statue of Hercules was defaced and toppled.54 Bishops petitioned for 
and received rulings against the rioters, and Erika Hermanowicz has an intriguing take on their 
tactics. They asked the imperial government to proclaim severe penalties, she suggests, only to 
lobby local officials “to mute prescribed sentences.”  So Christianity simultaneously labored to 
deter violence and win a reputation for clemency.55 
 Conjecture rather than evidence braces Hermanowicz’s intriguing reading of the bishops’ 
intentions. Augustine’s explanations are more straightforward and uncontroversial. They help us 
to place his thinking about punishment in context. The first reason he gave for distancing church 
practice from capital punishment was that the blood of those who caused Christians pain stained 
their casualties--particularly, the faith’s martyrs’--memories.  So Augustine coached magistrates 
to resist retaliation that “shamed” the victims for whom they were exacting vengeance.56 His 
second reason was more pragmatic. Severely punishing the faith’s persecutors would probably 
prompt reprisals, so few of the faithful would risk offering testimony, which could put them in 
danger. Ironically, therefore, when punitive measures were severe, persecutors were not deterred 
from committing atrocities, but emboldened, because victims were reluctant to report them.  The 
victims of harassment and more sinister forms of hostility were in a difficult spot. They had been 
instructed by the apostle Paul to overcome evil with good (Romans 12:21); if their accounts of 
atrocities led to the deaths of perpetrators, they would be acting contrary to that counsel and at 
great risk. Yet their silence inadvertently increased the risk to all the faithful, Augustine added, 
for when persecutors learned their crimes would go unreported, they grew all the more violent.  
Capital punishments, in other words, forced the faithful to choose to be killed by their enemies 
rather than to kill them through the courts.57 
16 
 
       *     *     * 
 
 The church’s bishops were responsible for making clear what distinguished faithful 
Christians from others. The former were, formally, citizens of the terrestrial city but, finally, 
citizens of the celestial city. Those bishops, too, were formally subjects of their emperors and 
servants of the reigning civic order. As such they advocated punitive policies and practices that 
maintained law and order. Their advocacy may make them appear responsible for the “essential 
continuity” between secular policies or civic order and the celestial or “eschatological” city, as 
Burnell and other historians and ethicists maintain. And the correspondence generated by the 
Calama crisis of 408 looks as if it put Augustine in just that position, because the question of 
punishing pagans surfaced soon after they set fire to the church and murdered a priest in that city, 
roughly thirty miles inland from Augustine’s coastal see.  Possidius, Augustine’s first biographer 
and the bishop there, wanted government to assess punitive damages and travelled to Ravenna to 
have Emperor Honorius issue edicts to that effect. Calama’s pagans approached a local celebrity, 
Nectarius, to solicit Augustine and to persuade him of their remorse and their willingness to pay 
compensatory damages but also to win his support for leaving matters at that.  Those principally 
responsible for the riots feared corporal or even capital punishments. Moreover, they and others 
who participated wanted to avoid punitive damages that would leave them destitute.  Augustine 
believed that the rioters’ “astounding savagery,” if left unpunished or punished negligibly, might 
encourage pagans elsewhere to act similarly and could leave Christians defenseless.  He agreed 
to dissuade authorities from executions, speculating that poverty might induce the quality of 
repentance that would not only reconcile them to Christian neighbors but could conceivably 
draw them into Christians’ churches.58 
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 At this point, it may have occurred to Augustine that Christian bishops and government 
magistrates might collaborate to advance the purposes of each, to make more popular his once 
unpopular faith and to keep the peace, respectively.59 But Augustine emphasized that he was 
profoundly disturbed by Nectarius’s claim that civic piety and religious faith were distinct yet 
comparable and complementary “paths” to the same end.60 Persons in public service might aim 
to reach the celestial city, Augustine conceded, yet they took the wrong road. He gauged that the 
very contention that secular service, necessary to sustain order with edicts and punishments, was 
somehow commensurate with “the obligations of love” incumbent on Christians leads misguided 
claimants deeper into exile.61  As historian Ernst Dassmann noticed, early Christians turned their 
outcast status into a virtue; Augustine’s insistence that the faithful were pilgrims on earth, exiled 
from their true home, is a superb example of that transformation.  “Faithful exiles on pilgrimage 
in this world roam far from [the celestial city], the memory of which stirs sadness and sighing.” 
To be deeper into exile was to lose perspective, forget one’s otherworldly status in this world, 
and become uncritical of it. Augustine warned against all this when he urged Christians, who 
were lumbered with secular responsibilities and, as magistrates, had to torture witnesses and 
accused, to do their duty while praying for deliverance from same.62 
 Augustine, then, approved severity when it kept tensions from developing into religious 
conflicts. Unsurprisingly, he took special interest in deterring violence against Christians, so the 
obligations of love, for him, did not forbid corporal and capital punishment at every turn. When 
clemency, without risking the peace, plausibly served to repatriate them, or, as Michel Foucault 
wrote in his influential study of penology, “requalify them as citizens”--or, better still, to direct 
them into his faith, Augustine counseled mercy.63 But his counsel, on this count, hardly suggests 
that he was ready to reconsider what he perceived as “radical discontinuity[ies]” between earthly 
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justice and authentic justice, between the virtues of the faith’s saints and the glory that derives 
from public service, and between noble Romans and Christian martyrs.64 
 That Augustine does not persistently condemn civic virtue has been taken to signal, in 
James Smith’s terms, a “basically pro-imperial (and now pro-liberal or pro-democratic) stance 
emphasizing that Christians can be solidly engaged in the ‘common’ sphere of politics.” Hence, 
as we learned, Augustine frequently has been cast as an “accommodationist” and meliorist who 
accepted the normativity of political values without giving up the possibility that they might be 
brought into line with religious values.65 Casting of that sort bears comparison with Donatists’ 
suggestions that heaven might be brought closer to earth in godly communities trying to resist 
contamination. Augustine maligned such ideas. He believed that communities “in this wicked 
world” were permixta; the godly and ungodly lived and worked together until the end of time, 
and, for that reason, James Wetzel rightly proposes, Augustine was prepared to admit that even 
“a Christian regime [ought to] be expected to perpetuate the human tragedy of coercive justice, 
founded upon fear of retribution and infliction of punishment.”66 Mendacity (mendacium) and 
hypocrisy so gripped creatures, who loved themselves first and loved their neighbors and God 
after, if at all, that many efforts at reclamation were doomed.67 Punishment and a fear of force 
might bring a few hypocrites around, so to speak, but muscling out the sources of sin within on 
any grand scale and grounding “essential continuities” between the celestial and terrestrial--even 
in the ecclesial--was out of the question.  Augustine suggested as much in a letter that historians 
and ethicists now use to prove his interventions in political punitive practice establish “essential 
continuities” and to register him alongside social reformers. The letter to magistrate Macedonius 
does indeed commend clemency--and for reasons we have already sketched--but it also protests 
that Augustine was unconcerned with the social consequences. He was replying to officials who 
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feared that amnesties would lead to recidivism. Augustine insisted that social consequences did 
not and should not enter into bishops’ calculations. Their objective was simply to set an example 
of tenderness, to exhibit the obligation of love that made the Word and their faith compelling on 
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